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In 1973, concerns for
environmental and wildlife protection
prompted the creation of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). 2
Because individuals have become
more conscious and protective of their
surroundings, complaints brought
pursuant to the ESA have increased in
recent years. The large amount of
resulting litigation raises the issue of
who has standing to sue under the
statute. The Supreme Court has
developed and refined a "prudential
zone of interests" test to answer the
standing issue. However, many lower
courts remain uncertain of the proper
application of the test to
environmental statutes, including the
ESA.3 Consequently, the issue of
standing under the ESA is hotly
debated among federal courts. The
courts are currently split as to whether
minimum Article III requirements or
additional prudential tests should
regulate a plaintiff's judiciary access.
While many opponents articulate
numerous reasons against employment
of the zone of interests test,
proponents are equally adamant for
the test's usage.' In Bennett v.
Plenert, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
later viewpoint. Recently, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to eliminate some confusion,
and hopefully bring solidarity to the
splintered approaches taken by the
lower courts.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In Bennett v. Plenert the
Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether plaintiffs who assert no
interest in preserving
endangered species may sue the
government for violating the
procedures established in the ESA.'
Moreover, the court examined the
.question of whether the prudential
zone of interests test should be applied
when determining who has standing to
sue under the ESA.' The Ninth
Circuit found the zone of interests test
applicable under the ESA, holding that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
absent an interest in wildlife
preservation.9
Two Oregon ranchers,
Bennett and Giordano, and two
Oregon irrigation districts, Langell
Valley and Horsefly, filed suit against
the government under the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA for declaratory
and injunctive relief. "' The plaintiff
claims that a biological opinion issued
by the United States Fishery and
Wildlife Service (FWS) on July 22,
1992 violated the Endangered Species
Act (ESA)."
The biological opinion
examined the effects of the federal
government's Klamath Project
(hereafter the "Project") on the plight
of two endangered species, the Lost
River sucker and Shortnose sucker. 3
The Project, which was administered
by the Bureau of Reclamation
(hereafter the "Bureau"), involved the
commercial and recreational uses of
two reservoirs, the Clear Lake
reservoir in northern California and
'Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995).
116 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq (1973).
'Sanford A. Church, Note, A Defense of the 'Zone of Interests' Standing Test, 1983 DUKE L.J. 447, 448 (1983).
'Jeffrey W. Ring and Andrew F. Behrend, Using Plaintiff Motivation to Limit Standing: An Inappropriate Attempt to Short-Circuit
Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LIIG. 345, 347 (1994).
'Bennett, 63 F.3d 915.




"'Idat 916. The plaintiff's complaint alleged relief under the following sections of the ESA, APA, and NEPA: the ESA citizens-suit
provision, 16 U.S.C. s 1540(g)(1)(c), alleging violations of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et esq., and its implementing regulations, 50
CFR part 402, the NEPA of 1969, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, et seq., and the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.
"Bennett v. Plenert, No. 93-6076-HO, 1993 WL 669429, at *I (Or. D. Ct. Nov. 18, 1993).
"Id. Section 7 of the ESA requires each federal agency to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency...is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). To fulfill this obligation agencies are required to consult with the
Secretary of the Interior (through the FWS) or the Secretary of Commerce (through the National Marine Fisheries Service) depending on
the species involved. See 50 CFR § 402. If necessary, formal consultation must follow. See 50 CFR § 402.14(a). Subsequent to formal
consultation, the Service issues a biological "detailing how the agency action affects the species or its critical habitat." 16 U.S.C. § 1536
(b)(3)(A).
31d. See The Official World Wildlife Fund Guide to Endangered Species of North America (David W. Lowe, John R. Matthews, Charles
J. Moseley, 1990). Shortnose sucker fish, Chasmistes brevirostris, were placed on the endangered species list July 18, 1988. Although
they were once found throughout the Klamath Basin of Oregon, most were eliminated during in 1952. Today, their biggest threats are
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the Gerber reservoir in southern
Oregon.' The ESA required the FWS
to engage in formal consultation with
the Secretary of Interior, based on a
preliminary finding by the Bureau,
which concluded that extended
operation of the Project would
"adversely affect" the two species."
After consultation, the FWS
concluded that the "long-term
operation of the Klamath Project was
likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of the Lost River and
shortnose suckers.""' The FWS's
determination was detailed in the
challenged biological opinion. One
suggestion by the FWS to the Bureau
for protecting the species was that a
minimum water level in the two
reservoirs be maintained." The
Bureau endorsed this recommendation
on August 19, 1992, and informed the
FWS that it was in agreement with the
opinion's conclusions."
The plaintiffs alleged that the
government's biological opinion
violated the ESA because no direct
evidence substantiated the FWS's
finding that the Project endangered the
survival of the suckers.' 9 In support
of their position, the plaintiffs
produced contrary data which
indicated that the fish were
"reproducing successfully."2
Moreover, the complaint stated that
the government violated provisions of
the ESA by neglecting to
acknowledge the opinion's economic
effects." Therefore, the plaintiffs
argued that portions of the opinion
should be repealed, allowing them to
utilize the reservoirs' water for both
commercial and recreational
purposes."
The government moved to
dismiss the suit, arguing that the
plaintiffs lacked standing under the
ESA.2' Their reasoning was that
because the biological opinion was
non-binding, it failed to cause any
injury to the plaintiffs." Moreover,
the defendants asserted that the
plaintiffs lacked standing because the
supposed harm was not "a result of
the Secretary's failure to conserve the
two species of fish," nor could it "be
fairly traced to an alleged violation of
the Secretary's obligations under ESA
section 7(a)(1)."25
The United States District
Court for the District of Oregon set
forth the three elements necessary for
standing: (1) an injury in fact-an
invasion of a legally protected interest
which is concrete and particularized,
and actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical, (2) a
causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of-the
injury must be fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant,
and not the result of some third party
not before the court, and (3) it must
be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.
The court concluded that the ...Lost
River and shortnose suckers' interest
in using water for habitat" clashed
with the plaintiffs' intention to
consume the Project's water for both
recreational and commercial uses."
Therefore, the court held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing under the
ESA based on "an interest which
conflicted with the interests sought to
be protected by the Act."" The
plaintiffs appealed?9
The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision?" First,
the Ninth Circuit noted that the issue
before it was not a question of
whether the plaintiffs had met the
constitutional standing requirements
to file suit under the ESA, but whether
their action was allowed under the
prudential zone of interests test.'
Examination of both case precedent,
and legislative history, led to the
dams, which block fish's spawning runs. Lost River sucker fish, Delitistes luxatus, were placed on the endangered species list July 16,
1988. Similar to the shortnose sucker, survival is threatened by dam construction. Currently, the Lost Water sucker is cut off from
more than 95 percent of its historical spawning habitat.
"'Bennett, 1993 WL 669429 at * I.
"Bennett, 63 F.3d at 916.
1id.
"Id.
"Bennett, 1993 WL 669429 at *3.
"'Bennett, 63 F.3d at 916.
'Did.
2
'Bennet, 1993 WL 669429 at * 1. Section 4 of ESA, 16 U.S.C. s 1533(b)(2) requires that the economic impact of the determination
stated in the Service's biological opinion must be considered.
"Bennett, 63 F.3d at 916.
2 Id. at 917.
"'Bennett, 1993 WL 669429 at *1.
2Id.
"ld. at *3.






court's conclusion that the zones of
interests test applied to suits brought
directly under the ESA.Y Next, the
court addressed the issue of whether
the ESA protected those who asserted
an interest similar to the plaintiffs."
The court found the overall objective
of the ESA was to further species
preservation." The court determined
that the congressional intent behind
the enactment of the statute was to
stop and reverse the current
movement toward species extinction
at whatever cost." Moreover, the
court found that the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA was designed to
achieve the purpose of species
protection by allowing "interested
persons" to bring suit under the Act."
Therefore, the court held that because
the plaintiffs' sought only economic
and recreational benefits from the
water, their interests were only
"marginally related" to the underlying
purposes of the ESA, and their
interests were inconsistent with the
Act's purposes, thus they lacked
standing." On March 25, 1996, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari."
III. Legal History
Determining whether an
individual is a proper party plaintiff,
possessing standing to sue, is
regulated by Article III of the
Constitution." The Article III case
and controversy requirement sets forth
three elements of standing: an injury
in fact, causation, and redressability."
However, courts have adopted and
applied additional prudential standing
requirements in certain situations.
Prudential limitations include the
denial of standing if the injury is a
generalized grievance,4 ' if the plaintiff
is asserting the rights of a third party,"
or if the injury is not within the zone
of interests of a statute.43 Although
the Supreme Court has never
established guidelines for the
utilization of prudential standing tests,
lower courts employ the various
prudential standing tests frequently."
The prudential test applied by the
Ninth Circuit in Bennett v. Plenert was
the zone of interests test.45
The origin and development
of the zone of interests test consisted
of a liberalizing trend toward standing
requirements for 'competitors' suits,'
in which complainants challenge
agency actions that allegedly injure
competitors' ability to compete."
Before 1968, the courts employed a
legal interests test to determine the
issue of standing.' The legal
interests test held that individuals were
granted standing only when a legal
right was violated.' Legal rights
included rights based on property or
contract, rights based on protection
from tortious invasion, or rights based
on a statute which conferred a
privilege.4 9 In 1968, the Supreme
Court removed some of the obstacles
which prohibited standing, holding
that a plaintiff need only demonstrate
that a statute reflected a legislative
purpose to protect the competitor's
interest." The Court, in 1970, further
liberalized competitor standing by
introducing the zone of interests test
in Ass'n ofData Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp."
In Data Processing, a data
processors' association and data
processing corporation filed suit under
the APA against the Comptroller of
Currency challenging a ruling which
allowed national banks to offer data
processing services to other banks and
bank customers." Both the District
Court and Court of Appeals denied
standing to the plaintiffs, relying on
the legal interests test." The Supreme
Court, stating that the legal interests
test went to the merits, replaced the
test with a two-step standing
analysis.'
321d.





"Bennett, 1995 WL 699127.
"U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
"Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).
4Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,475 (1982).
42Id. at 474.
43Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
"Church, supra note 6, at 449.
45Bennett, 63 F3d at 917.
46Church, supra note 6, at 449.




1"Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
"Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
521d. at 152.
"ld. at 152-153.
""Church, supra note 6, at 452.
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First, the Supreme Court
held that a court must determine
whether a plaintiff had stated an injury
in fact, as required by Article III
constitutional standing requirements."
Here, the petitioners clearly met the
first prong, alleging that future
revenue loss, in addition to a decrease
in customer numbers, would result
from respondents' competition.'
Second, an essential inquiry must be
made to resolve whether Congress
intended a particular plaintiff to bring
suit against agency rulings.s>
Although the APA, which grants
standing to an aggrieved person,'
should be interpreted to serve a broad,
remedial purpose, 9 the Court found
that Congress had not intended to
allow every individual suffering injury
in fact to bring suit.' The Court
provided a gloss on the meaning of
aggrieved, requiring that "...the
interest sought to be protected by the
complainant [wa]s arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question.""
However, where a statute existed, the
Court noted a trend toward expanding
those individuals able to bring suit.6
Because the Court found that the
petitioners were aggrieved persons as
competitors of the national banks, and
no evidence existed that Congress
intended to limit judicial review of
administrative rulings under the APA,
the Court held that the plaintiffs had
standing to sue.
In the decade following the
Data Processing decision, it appeared
that the zone of interests test had been
deserted.' However, in 1987, the
Court revived the doctrine, attempting
to clarify when and how to apply the
test. 5 In Clarke v. Securities Indus.
Ass'n, the respondent trade
association, representing securities
brokers, underwriters, and investment
bankers, filed suit against both the
Comptroller of the Currency and the
Securities Industry Association. 6 The
trade association alleged that the
Comptroller's determination,
indicating that Security Pacific's
operation of discount brokerage
services to the public would not
violate the National Bank Act's
branching provisions, violated the
McFadden Act."' The Comptroller
disagreed, first on the merits of the
position, and second, on standing
grounds.' The petitioner argued that
respondents lacked standing because
the congressional intent behind the
Act was to establish competitive
equality between state and national
banks, not to protect securities
dealers.' The District and Appellate
Court held that the respondent had
standing?"
In deciding Clarke, the
Supreme Court sought guidance from
Data Processing's initial formulation
of the zone of interests test." First,
the Court followed the 1970 decision
by defining "a relevant statute" in
section 702 very broadly." Second,
"Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154.
"Id. at 153.
"Id.
"5 U.S.C. Sec. 702 (1946) ("aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the relevant statute").
"Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955).
wData Processing, 397 U.S. at 154.61 d. at 153.
6id. at 154.
63Id. at 157-158.
"Bennen, 63 F.3d at 917. See John C. Yang, The D.C. Circuit Review September 1989 -August 1990 Chapter Standing, Standing...In
the Doorway ofJustice, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1356, 1394 (1991). The Court initially applied the zone of interests test only four
times, all shortly after the Data Processing decision. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,
400 U.S. 45 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); ADPSO v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). However, the Supreme Court
implicitly used the zone of interest test in two cases. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, n. 16 (1982); Boston Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320-321 n.3(1977). In addition, the Court acknowledged the test in numerous post-1971 cases. See e.g.,
Gladstone, Realtors, v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 n.6 (1979); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39
n.19 (1976); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 & n.13 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 & n.5 (1972).
'Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987). See Yang, supra note 64, at 1364. Since the four original cases applying the
zone of interests test, the Court has only applied the test three times. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3186-3187
(1990); Clarke, 479 U.S. at 394-403, Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230-231 n.4 (1986).
"6Clarke, 479 U.S. at 392-393.
"Id. at 390-392. Sections 7 and 8 of the McFadden Act, 44 Stat. 1228, which place limits on the legal activities available to banks, are
codified, as amended, at 12 U.S.C. § 36 and 12 U.S.C § 81.
"Clarke, 479 U.S. at 393.
"d.
'id. The Security Pacific and the Comptroller sought review by petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted both petitions, and
consolidated the cases. 475 U.S. 1044 (1986).
"Clarke, 479 U.S. at 394-396.
n5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
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the Court approved of expanding the
number of individuals able to bring
suit." Moreover, the Court reaffirmed
the test as a guide for deciding
whether, in view of Congress' evident
intent to make agency action
presumptively reviewable, a particular
plaintiff should be heard to complain
of a particular agency decision." The
Supreme Court went further than its
decision in Data Processing as it
attempted to develop the zone of
interest test into a workable doctrine."
In order to eliminate the
confusion and unpredictability of
applying the test, the Court indicated
that the doctrine was applicable to
suits filed under other statutes, despite
the fact that the principle cases had
applied the test to the APA.76
However, the Court quickly warned
that the zone of interest inquiry under
the APA should not be employed
universally." Thus, where a plaintiff
was not the direct subject of the
contested regulatory action, "the test
denie[d] a right of review if the
plaintiff's interests are so marginally
related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it
[could not] be reasonably assumed
that Congress intended to permit the
suit.""
Once interests were arguably
within the zone of interest to be
protected by the Act, the Court
concluded that congressional intent
must also be examined.' 9 This
included the intent of the statute under
which the plaintiffs sued, additional
provisions which help courts
understand Congress' overall purpose,
and all other indicators valuable when
interpreting intent." In addition, the
courts must closely scrutinize
statutory construction, giving great
weight to any reasonable construction
of a regulatory statute adopted by the
agency actually charged with the
statute's enforcement."'
Despite the guidance by the
Supreme Court, federal courts are
currently split as to whether the zone
of interests analysis applies to ESA
suits.12 Both the Ninth Circuit and the
District of Columbia have expressly
held that the zone of interests test
applies to the Act."' However, the
Eight Circuit has held that the Act's
citizen-suit provision renders the zone
of interests test inapplicable.' Other
courts have yet to address the issue.-
The Ninth Circuit addressed
the issue of standing under the ESA
in Pacific Northwest Generating Co-
Op v. Brown.' In Pacific Northwest,
plaintiffs challenged a biological
opinion's projected impact of
hydropower operations upon three
listed species of salmon, alleging
violations of the ESA's consultation
clause and the APA." The federal
defendants argued that all plaintiffs
lacked standing." The Appellate
Court recognized three elements
necessary for constitutional standing."
First, the plaintiffs must have suffered
an injury in fact.' Second, there must
be a causal relationship between the
injury and the conduct complained of
by the plaintiffs." Third, it must be




6Bennett, 63 F.3d at 917 (citing Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16). The zone of interests test has been applied to numerous statutes in
addition to the APA. See, e.g., Central Arizona Water Conservation District v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1538-1539 (9th Cir.) (Clean Air
Act); Self-Insurance Institute v. Korioth, 993 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1993) (preemption); ANR Pipeline v. Corp. Comm'n of State of Okla.,
860 F.2d 1571, 1579 (10th Cir. 1988)





82Bennett, 63 F.3d at 918, n 3.
53Pacific Northwest Generating Co-Op v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 1994); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d
1568, 1581 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1993); State of Idaho By and Thru Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n v. ICC, 35 F.3d 585, 592 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
"Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1988), opinion after remand, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555.
'-Bennett, 63 E3d at 918.
"Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1063-1068.
"Id. at 1062.
881d.
91d. at 1063 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.).
'"ld. Injury in fact constituted an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.
91Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. A causal connection is established when the injury is "fairly...trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not...th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Orgns., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
42 MELPR
likely as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.2
The plaintiffs failed to prove all three
elements, injury in fact, causation, and
redressability." Although the plaintiffs
were unable to satisfy Article III
constitutional requirements, the court
found that they satisfied footnote
seven standing9" due to their economic
interest in the salmon.9 However, in
addition to Article III standing
requirements, the court applied the
prudential zone of interests test under
the ESA." The court held that the
plaintiffs met the zone of interests test
due to their economic interests in
salmon preservation, including the
benefits they would receive from
healthy waterways and fish and
improved public image from the
restoration. 7
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit
again addressed the issue of standing
under the ESA."9 In Mount Graham,
the Mount Graham International
Observatory project was designed to
erect sophisticated telescopes on Mt.
Graham." The ESA required the plan
be examined by the FWS because the
land was administered by the Forest
Service."" Despite a FWS Biological
Opinion, concluding that the
construction would increase the
likelihood of harm to the red squirrel,
congressional passage of Title VI of
the Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act
(AICA) allowed the construction to
continue due to issuance of a special
use permit.'"' Environmental groups
(Sierra Club) filed suit, seeking an
injunction to stop the construction of
the project in the habitat of the
endangered red squirrel." The
defendants alleged that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to seek judicial review
under the ESA."'
The court granted standing
to Sierra Club."' First, the plaintiffs
proved injury in fact, alleging that
individuals' scientific, recreational,
and aesthetic enjoyment in the red
squirrel would disappear if the animal
went extinct."' Second, Sierra Club's
alleged interests fell within the zone of
interests protected under the AICA."*
Although the defendant argued that
the sole purpose of the AICA was to
further observatory construction, the
court found that an additional AICA
purpose was to amass data on the red
squirrel which was to be used during
the FWS consultation process.""
Because a monitoring device was
included in the AICA, the court
concluded that Congress was
concerned with the possible extinction
of the red squirrel."" Therefore, the
plaintiffs' interests fell within the zone
of interests protected by the statute."
The District of Columbia
Circuit has also applied the zone of
interest test to suits brought under the
ESA. "o In State of Idaho, respondent
Union Pacific attempted to abandon
"'Id. at 561 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).
"Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1063-1064.
"Id. at 1065. Footnote seven standing is described by illustration of the hypothetical plaintiff in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 n. 7. There, the Court stated the "under our caselaw, one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally
licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, even though he
cannot establish with certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be
completed for many years." One so situated can proceed "without meeting all the normal standards of redressability and immediacty.
Id. The plaintiffs in Pacific Northwest can be compared to the person living next to the proposed dam, and, thus, satisfies footnote
seven standing. Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1065.
"Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573. The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests
can assert that right without meeting all the normal stands for redressability and immediacy.
""Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1065.
971d. at 1065-1066.
"Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1568, 1580 (9th Cir. 1993).
"Id. at 1569.
'ml6 U.S.C. § 1536 (1973).




"'*Id. at 158 1.




1 d. at 1582-1583. The Ninth Circuit lowered the barrier for standing in Mt. Graham by indicating that they would have to conclude
"not only that the Sierra Club's interest is inconsistent with the purposes of the AICA, but also that this inconsistency is so fundamental
as to make it impossible to believe that Congress intended to permit Sierra Club to bring suit."
"State of Idaho By and Thru Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n v. ICC, 35 F.3d 585, 591-592 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of
Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Panhandle Producers v. Economic Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d 1105 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Control Data MELPR 43
Wallace Branch, a portion of railroad
track in northern Idaho."' Petitioners
raised environmental and economic
objections to the potential
abandonment.'12 Although the
Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) granted Union Pacific's
application, they placed six conditions
upon respondent in order to safeguard
the environment against salvage
operation."' The petitioners, Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, several shippers, and
the State of Idaho, argued that the
ICC's ruling violated the Interstate
Commerce Act, and that the
Commission should have prepared an
Environmental Impact Statement
under NEPA, and a Biological
Assessment under ESA." 4
Respondents claimed that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring
suit."
The Court of Appeals first
applied the three minimum
requirements for standing under
Article III, injury in fact, causation,
and redressability."6 In addition, the
court employed prudential standing
requirements, particularly the zone of
interests test."' First, the court
concluded that the petitioner shippers
had standing to bring suit against the
ICC's allowance of abandonment
because the petitioners experienced an
injury by having to find substitute
shipping methods, and their interests
fell within the zone of interests
protected by the Interstate Commerce
Act."' Therefore, the State of Idaho
also had standing."9 Second, the
court concluded that Idaho had
standing to challenge the
Commission's conditional
authorization of salvage activities,
given that Union Pacific's actions
would cause injurious pollution to
Idaho's land." Therefore, the
shippers also had standing.'2 ' Third,
the court found that the State had
prudential standing to assert an ESA
claim due to its dedication of state-
owned land for the management of
water fowl, hunting, and fishing. 2
Moreover, the court noted that the
statute specifically authorized State
claims."' Because of this, the
petitioners met the zone of interests
test, allowing them to bring suit under
the ESA.'2'
Despite application of the
zone of interests test to ESA actions
by the Ninth Circuit and the District of
Columbia Circuit, the Eight Circuit
has held that the Act's citizen-suit
provision eliminated the utilization of
prudential standing requirements."' In
Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiffs
(hearafter"Defenders") filed suit
against the Department of Interior,
alleging a violation of the ESA's
consultation clause." This was due
to the government's conclusion that
United States agencies which were
funding foreign projects had no
obligation to consult with the
Secretary of the Interior about the
projects' impact on endangered
species."' The defendants challenged





4 d. at 590.
"Id.
"ld. at 590 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S.560-561).
"'Id. at 590-591. See 13 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.7 at 507.
"'id. at 591.
"
9Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 987 F.2d 806, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[Iff one party has standing in an action, a
court need not reach the issue of the standing of other parties when it makes no difference to the merits of the case.").
'State of Idaho By and Thru Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n v. ICC, 35 F.3d 585,590 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-561 (The court does not consider the Article III standing requirements of causation and redressability because
the suit involves procedural rights (i.e. the right to require an agency to prepare an environmental impact statement or a biological
assessment).
12 'Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 987 F.2d at 8 10.
"'State of Idaho, 35 F.3d at 592. See Environmental Comments of the State of Idaho and Through the Idaho Public Utilities
Commission, Joint Appendix at 153 (The State owned over 80 percent of the Coeur d'Alene River Wildlife Management Area, where an
"upwards of 20 (bald] eagles had been sighted." "The primary objective of the [Wildlife Management Area] is to manage water fowl
[sic] production and hunting as well as fishing resources.").
"'See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1988) (§ 1540(g) states that "any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf..,to enjoin
any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency...who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof..."); 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (The ESA includes "any State"
within its definition of "person.").
"
4State of Idaho, 35 F.3d at 592.
"'Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1988).
2616 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (1973).
'Defenders of Wildlife, 851 F.2d at 1036.
11Id. at 1039.
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Defender's standing under the ESA. 2 9
The district court sided with the
government, concluding that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring
suit.'"2
On review, the Eighth Circuit
first applied Article III standing
requirements, injury in fact, causation,
and redressability.1' Before
determining whether the three criteria
had been met by Defenders, the
Eighth Circuit noted that some courts
had imposed additional prudential
standing requirements on a plaintiff's
ability to bring a claim."' However,
the court only required that the
Defenders satisfy the three
constitutional requirements for
standing under the ESA. " Because
Congress could eliminate these
limitations by legislation,' the ESA
specifically allows any person the
ability to file suit for a violation of the
Act."' Therefore, the court held that
the statute's citizen-suit provision
eliminated the application of the zone
of interests test.' Because the
plaintiffs had proven injury in fact,
causation and redressability, they had
standing to bring suit.'
The application of the zone
of interests test to ESA suits has been
met with both criticism and support."'
The Ninth Circuit, in both Pacific
Northwest"' and Mount Graham, '
and the District of Columbia Circuit,
in State of Idaho,"' support its usage
in ESA suits. The prudential
requirements result in limiting access
to the federal court system to those
plaintiffs Congress intended to
protect. However, the Eight Circuit's
ruling in Defenders of Wildlife refuses
to apply standing requirements in
addition to the Article III elements.'4'
IV. The Instant Decision
The plaintiffs first argued that
the biological opinion issued by the
FWS, which found that the long-term
operations of the Klamath Project
would adversely affect the sucker
fishes, lacked adequate evidence to
support its conclusion.'42 The ranch
operators and irrigation districts
produced data indicating that the fish
were reproducing successfully,
needing no special protection."' The
plaintiffs demanded that the portions
of the opinion mandating increased
minimum water levels be vacated."'
They stated that due to the biological
opinion's incorrect conclusion, the
government attempted to institute
unnecessary limitations on the
reservoirs."
The defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint, contending that
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue."
They argued there was no standing
because plaintiff's desire to utilize the
water for commercial and recreational
purposes was inconsistent with the
suckers' interest in the water for
habitat. 43
Before addressing the merits
of the plaintiffs' suit, the court first
examined the standing issue under the
zone of interests test.' 4 Although the
court acknowledged that it had
previously applied the test to actions
brought under the ESA, 49 it did note
the plaintiff's suggestion that case
precedent was inconclusive as to
whether the test must be currently
applied." Their reasoning suggested
that because the prior cases failed to
1291d.





3 2Defenders of Wildlife, 851 F.2d at 1039.
'
3 Gladstone, Realtors, v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
'116 U.S.C. § 1540(g). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (Environmental associations
are "person" and may bring suit in their own name.).
' Id. See e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 733 (Although the Eight Circuit held that Defenders need not satisfy the zone of
interests test for standing under the ESA, the zone of interests test does apply to actions brought under § 702 of the APA.).
'3Id. at 1039-1044.
'
37Church, supra note 6, at 455-469.
'"Pacific Northwest Generating Co-Op v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 1994).
"MI. Graham, 986 F.2d at 1582.
'"State of Idaho, 35 F.3d at 590-591.
"'Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 1039.
'




4sBennett, 1993 WL 669429 at * 1.




'*See Pacific Northwest, 38 F.3d at 1065; Mi. Graham, 986 F.2d at 1581 & n.8. In both decisions, the Ninth Circuit applied the zone
of interests tests, holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to standing because they failed to assert an interest in preserving a threatened or
endangered species.
"'Bennett, 63 F3d at 918.
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address whether the ESA's citizen-suit
provision overrode the test's standing
limitations, the court was not required
to apply the test."s' Moreover,
plaintiffs alleged that the provision's
broad language granted them standing
to sue under the ESA. '"
The court, in rejecting the
plaintiffs' argument, noted that many
federal district and appellate courts
had frequently applied the test in
similar situations, despite the presence
of broad citizen-suit provisions in the
ESA, the Clean Water Act (CWA),
and the Farn Laborer Contractor
Registration Act (FLCRA).'5 3 For
instance, the Eleventh Circuit applied
the zone of interest test to a citizen-
suit brought under the FLCRA.1" The
Ninth Circuit held that the existence of
a citizen-suit provision in a statute
was not dispositive as to whether
Congress intended for any plaintiff to
have standing to sue under the
FLCRA.'" This court followed the
Eleventh Circuit's decision and
applied the prudential standing
limitation, the zone of interests test, to
acitizen-suit. 5 6
After concluding that
employment of the zone of interest
test was warranted, the court next
addressed whether the plaintiffs'
interests were protected under the
ESA.'3 7 The court examined the
purpose of the legislation to determine
whether Congress intended to protect
the plaintiffs' interests.' In
determining the ESA's purpose, the
court explored both the statutory
language and judicial history of the
Act.' 19 The following provision, 16
U.S.C. § 1531(b), set forth the
legislation's purposes:
to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which the
endangered species and
threatened species depend may
be conserved, to provide a
program for the conservation of
such endangered species and
threatened species, and to take
such steps as may be appropriate
to achieve the purposes of the
treaties and conventions set
forth in subsection (a) of this
section."'
In order to interpret the section the
court sought guidance from its recent
decision in Pacific Northiwest.'6'
There, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that because the plaintiffs' interests in
maintaining current hydropowercosts
failed to state a desire to preserve an
endangered or threatened species, they
were not protected interests.'"2 The
court interpreted the statute similarly
in the present case, holding that the
plaintiffs' recreational and commercial
interests in the reservoir water were
unprotected.' The court found that
the plaintiffs failed to raise any
allegations that the defendant's
biological opinion would injure the
Lost River sucker or shortnose sucker,
contending only that the opinion was
unnecessary to preserve the fish."
Moreover, the court determined that
the ranchers and irrigation districts
asserted no commonality of interests
between themselves and the fish.'"
Instead, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs only alleged that the fish
15 Id.
'"Id. The Act's citizen-suit provision allowed "any person [to] commence a civil suit on his own behalf- a) to enjoin any person,
including the United States [and its agencies], who is alleged to be in a violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued
under the authority thereof..."
'"Id. The court noted a division between the circuits regarding the application of the zone of interests test to ESA suits.
'"See Davis Forestry Corp. v. Smith, 707 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1lth Cir. 1983). Because farm labor contractors filed suits in order to injure
competitors, not lessen the atrocities suffered by migrant workers, the court concluded that the contractors' injuries fell outside the zone
of interests safeguarded by the FLCRA.
'"Bennett, 63 F.3d at 919. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 570-580, 112 S.Ct at 2142-2146 (Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife makes it clear that Congress did not intend to permit suits by those who fail to satisfy the constitutionally-mandated standing




'"See Dan Caputo Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation, 749 F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1994) (The Ninth Circuit denied standing under
the CWA to a plaintiff who sought grant funds, but did not assert an interest that "artolse from an interest in the environment" or
"vindication of environmental concerns."); Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713,716 (9th Cir. 1993) (The Ninth
Circuit similarly held that plaintiffs do not have standing under NEPA to protect "purely economic interest, because the environmental
purposes of the act would not be furthered by permitting suits premised on such interests.).
"Bennett, 63 F.3d at 920-21.
6"l6 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1973). The citizen-suit provision existing in the ESA is similar to one found in NEPA. See Nevada Land
Action, 8 F.3d at 716 (quoting the purposes section of NEPA).
'"Pacific Northwest Generating Co-Op v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 1994).
'
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were viable at previous water levels. 6*
The Ninth Circuit also
examined judicial authority in its
quest to identify the true purposes of
the ESA. The focus was placed
mainly on the Supreme Court decision
in Tennessee Valley Authority, which
completed an extensive analysis of the
Act's purposes.'67 There, the Court
found the congressional intent of the
statute to be the prevention and
reversal of species elimination." The
Ninth Circuit agreed with this
interpretation. 69
Next the court addressed the
plaintiffs' final argument that because
the government violated the ESA by
failing to recognize the biological
opinion's economic impact in
designating a critical habitat for a
species, that plaintiffs were adversely
affected, giving them standing to
sue.' The court, although
acknowledging the existence of
numerous factors to be weighed by the
government when establishing a
critical habitat, deemed the
considerations merely instructive."'
The court found that the legislature's
intent was simply to supply direction
to the government in order to
guarantee rational decision-making."'
The court concluded that because the
plaintiffs' interpretation contradicted
the Act's very goals"' by granting
standing to individuals whose
interests failed to further species
protection, their analysis was
flawed."' Therefore, the court held
that the ranch operators and irrigation
districts lacked standing because the
zone of interest test applied to the
ESA. Statutory interpretation and
judicial authority concluded that the
Act's purpose was the protection of
endangered species, and the
plaintiffs' commercial and recreational
interests fell outside the ESA's zone of
interest."
V. Comment
The use of a zone of interests
test to limit standing in federal courts
has been criticized by many as a
disturbing trend toward limiting broad
citizen suit provisions developed by
Congress."' The primary arguments
against utilization of the prudential
standing test are threefold. First,
Congress has the power to expand
standing under Article III, allowing
the legislature to statutorily create
broad citizen suit provisions in
environmental statutes."' Second,
prudential standing requirements are
irrelevant given congressional
expansion of standing through citizen
suit provisions."' Third, both legal
and policy considerations discourage
the use of the zone of interests test.'79
The determination of the
proper party plaintiff to bring a cause
of action is a power held by Congress,
subject only to Article III
limitations.'" Through the legislative
creation of citizen suit provisions,
Congress has extended standing "to
the full limits of Article Ill."" Such
broad standing under the ESA was
designed to guarantee citizens' rights
to protect their environment, and to
facilitate the enforcement of laws by
federal agencies.'" Therefore, critics
argue that the new statutory
framework can best be carried out by
applying the minimum Article Ill
requirements, not additional prudential
tests, to plaintiffs who bring an
environmental claim under a citizen
suit provision.'
The second argument raised
against the use of a plaintiff
motivation test' 4 suggests that
because citizen suit provisions expand
standing only to Article III limits,
courts lack the power to impose
prudential barriers to citizen suits."'
Therefore, allowing the judicial branch
to assume congressional powers,
through the court's application of
prudential standing limitations to
citizen suit claims, violates both the
'"Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). See also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
'"Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. at 184.




"MId. See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that the fact that Congress
mandates that certain methods be used to achieve its goals does not express its intent to benefit every person who has an interest in those
methods being followed).
'
71See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 397 n. 12 (1987).
"Bennett, 63 F.3d at 922.
1"Id. at 921-22.




"Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 732 n.3.
"'Gladstone, Realtors, v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979).
"'Ring and Behrend, supra note 4, at 351.
'sId. at 348.
'"Id. at 346. The authors refer to the zone of interests test as a plaintiff motivation test for the purposes of the article.
"'Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982).
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separation of powers doctrine and
infringes upon the legislature's
traditional role of setting regulatory
policy.116
The third criticism of the
zone of interests test proffers policy
considerations for invalidating the
motivation test.' 7 First, additional
standing requirements will disallow
deserving complainants access to the
federal courts.' Individuals will be
forced to meet the plaintiff motivation
test to gain entrance into the courts,
while the additional requirements will
cause the judiciary to make arbitrary
decisions.') Second, a zone of
interests test requires the plaintiff to
make two separate showings of facts;
one showing of facts is necessary to
overcome the proper motivation
hurdle, and another showing is
required during a trial on the merits."
This will harm the judicial economy,
depleting resources and causing
needless delays."' Moreover,
presenting the necessary facts in order
to meet the zone of interests test will
result in decisions on the merits
without both parties being fully heard
on the issues.'9
Third, a motivation test
forces courts to determine issues on
which they lack competency, namely a
plaintiff's motivation.' 1 The
speculative nature of determining a
person's true motive for filing suit is
legally impermissible.'" Not only will
judicial speculation lead to arbitrary
standing decisions, but it will also
reduce individuals' confidence in the
judiciary.'" Fourth, congressional
power to create protected interests
through regulatory statutes is
thwarted if the legislature lacks the
power to enforce pronouncements
through citizen suit provisions."
Given that Congress can establish
interests through regulatory statutes,
they should also be able to guarantee
effective enforcement of these
interests.19 This is best achieved by
the elimination of prudential standing
requirements, which seriously threaten
judicial restraint.' 6 Finally,
environmental laws could become
skewed, reflecting only the viewpoints
of those granted access to the federal
court system.'9 If the judiciary
controls access to the courts through
the plaintiff motivation test, they could
encourage "an unbalanced scheme of
regulatory review [since] courts can
protect the interests of regulated
entities, but the interests of 'regulatory
beneficiaries' are left to the political
process."2"0
Given the criticisms against
utilization of a plaintiff motivation
standing test, many conclude that
only Article Ill requirements should
determine issues of standing.2"
Therefore, they disagree with the
court's application of the zone of
interest test to an ESA citizen suit in
Bennett v. Plenert.2 "2 However, many
legal scholars, as well as federal
district and appellate courts support
the usage of the prudential zone of
interests test. 2 3 Support for the
application of the zone of interests test
outweighs the criticisms.
According to its many
advocates, the zone of interests test
forestalls unwarranted judicial
involvement in executive branch
decisionmaking, while permitting
private individuals to file complaints
where Congress arguably intended to
protect plaintiffs' interests.2 4" Without
such prudential limitations, the courts
would be left to resolve diverse legal
questions despite the fact that other
governmental bodies would be more
competent to resolve such
questions.2 s Therefore, supporters
contend the test is beneficial when it is
utilized properly.2"
Correct application of the
prudential zone of interest test raises
"Ring and Behrend, supra note 4, at 353. The Eight Circuit clearly supports this analysis, given its holding in Lujan v. Defenders of




















2 Bennett, 63 F.3d at 915.
2"aChurch, supra note 6, at 464-70.
m"Id. at 464.
10Id. at 465. In Warth v. Seldin, the Court stated that "Without such limitations-closely related to Article III concerns but
essentially matters of judicial self-governance--the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance
even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions..." 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
""'Church, supra note 6, at 464.
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two questions, how and when it
should be employed." With respect
to how the test should be applied,
ideally only the words of the statute
should be interpreted to avoid
addressing the merits of a lawsuit"s
For example, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, in
determining whether the plaintiff's
interest was arguably protected by
statutory language, examined
legislative history only if it articulated
an intent to protect or ignore the
interest."" Therefore, legislative
history need not be consulted as it is
when addressing a case's merits."'
The second question, when
to utilize the zone of interests test, has
been addressed by the Supreme
Court."' The prudential analysis
applies in competitor suits against the
government where the plaintiff relies
on a statute, given that economic,
aesthetic, conservational, or
recreational interests are set forth in
the complaint. 212 Therefore,
supporters contend that the zone of
interest test is very useful if courts
remember four simple rules: (1) the
test applies only where a statutory law
is relied on for legal protection of an
asserted interest, (2) legislative
history is not required under the test,
(3) standing should be easily
conferred under the prudential zone of
interests analysis, and (4) the test is
irrelevant in situations where standing
is congressionaly approved in the
statutory language.23
VI. CONCLUSION
Given both the strong
criticisms and supporting arguments
regarding utilization of the zone of
interests test under the ESA, the
question raised is whether the
Supreme Court will apply the zone of
interests test to issues of standing
under the ESA. The Supreme Court's
recent decision to grant certiorari in
Bennett v. Plenert makes a decision
on ESA standing requirements
forthcoming."' However, an analysis
of the Court's composition, coupled
with its recent pronouncements
regarding standing, foreshadow the
future ruling. Given the conservative
majority of the current Supreme Court,
who support decreasing judicial
access, the zone of interests test will
likely be applied to claims brought
under the ESA.215 Moreover, the
Court's recent decisions illustrate an
effort to limit a plaintiff's ability to file
suit in the federal court system.216
Both Justice Scalia, in Lujan,21" and
Justice Rehnquist, inAir Courier 21 1
decrease the number of proper party
plaintiffs through strict interpretation
of the zone of interest test.2 9 These
rulings encompass conservative
viewpoints, specifically judicial
deference to the legislature and
separation of powers doctrine.221'
Therefore, the Supreme Court will
likely refuse to grant standing to
plaintiffs' citizen suit under the ESA.
1Id. at 465-69.
"ld. at 465.
2011ax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal, 556 F.2d 130, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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